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The post-industrial transformation of labor markets and its political consequences are 
becoming a major topic in political science. One emerging strand of research deals with how 
labor market vulnerability affects policy and party preferences (see symposium introduction). 
In this contribution we, first, provide an overview over different conceptual approaches to 
studying labor market vulnerability and political preferences.1 We then discuss what must 
appear to the uninitiated as a confusing variety of vulnerability operationalizations. This 
discussion complements Vlandas’s empirical contribution to this issue. Finally, we 
recommend vulnerability measures for use in preference research based on two criteria: 
coherence with theory and ease of interpretation. In doing so, we hope to make it easier for 




With some simplification, the literature on labor-market vulnerability and political 
preferences clusters in three groups. First, the individual-risk approach focuses on job 
characteristics that influence preferences through economic self-interest. Analogously to low 
income, unemployment risk leads individuals to support social protection and political parties 
that promise it, typically left-wing parties. The argument has been applied inter alia to 
exposure to globalization (Walter 2010; 2017) and occupational unemployment (Rehm 2009) 
and assumes individualistic and economically instrumental decision makers. Risk is usually 
conceptualized as a continuum and as varying in degree across individuals.  
Second, insider-outsider theory is also based on the nexus between objective risk, 
self-interest, and policy demand. It adds the notion that risk is distributed discontinuously as a 
result of labor-market institutions. In particular, dismissal regulation creates two segments: 
‘Insiders’ have regular employment contracts and are relatively insulated from 
unemployment. ‘Outsiders’ cannot find jobs or have non-standard jobs with higher 
unemployment risk. Thus, distinct legal categories of employment contracts create a 
discontinuous distribution of risk. Accordingly, insider-outsider theory deviates from a purely 
individualistic decision logic and incorporates an organizational argument. Insiders benefit as 
a group from their organization in unions and from ties to social democratic parties. Outsiders 
are a diffuse group lacking effective representation. These group-level divisions stand in 
contrast to traditional partisan theory, which regards labor as a unitary actor (Rueda 2007).  
 
1 We focus on characteristics of vulnerable jobs rather than socio-structural antecedents of vulnerability (such as 




Third, sociologists and psychologists stress the subjectivity of labor-market 
vulnerability. This approach diverges from rationalist political-economy premises. It 
highlights that “two employees in the same situation can experience differing degrees of job 
insecurity because they will perceive and interpret the situation differently” (Sverke, Hellgren 
and Näswall 2002: 243). The perspective has conceptual advantages. It acknowledges that 
those who seem institutionally well protected may actually perceive their situation as 
insecure. After all, insecurity can also stem from macro-economic, company-specific, or 
personal factors; all of which are reflected in subjective assessments. Moreover, the 
subjective approach facilitates a more nuanced conceptualization of risk, e.g. distinguishing 
between cognitive and affective insecurity (Anderson and Pontusson 2007) and between 
worries about job loss and worries about re-employment (Marx 2014). It thereby lends itself 
to a more explicit theorization of labor market risks and psychological mechanisms. How 
objective risk factors translate into subjective worries should, for instance, depend on 
information about the job market and personality traits. Finally, subjective measures provide 
a parsimonious way to take into account sources of (in)security at the household level. 
Despite these advantages, subjective insecurity is rarely used to explain political preferences 
(but see Hacker, Rehm and Schlesinger 2013).  
 
Operationalizations and pitfalls 
 
The individual-risk concept is typically captured by merging individual with occupational or 
sectoral information. For instance, the extent to which a job is ‘offshorable’ is used to 
measure the risks workers face in specific occupations (Walter 2017). Similarly, the level of 
unemployment in an occupation indicates risks for workers employed in it. Interestingly then, 
the individual-risk approach tends to rely on aggregated data. This creates a certain risk of 
committing ecological fallacies. In addition, these operationalizations rely on statistical 
accounting categories (e.g. International Standard Classification of Occupations) that have 
been created independently of the research question at hand. Consequently, researchers need 
to make sure that these categories are sensible for their theoretical purpose. They also need an 
argument why the specific context (e.g. occupation) matters regardless of the individual work 
situation. For occupational unemployment (Rehm 2009), the case can be made that job 
markets are differentiated by occupation and that the market situation affects risks of both 
employed and unemployed workers in that occupation. At the same time, occupational or 
sectoral risk measures are relatively transparent and intuitive. They are easy to compute and, 
owing to standardized classifications, comparable for most industrialized countries. Finally, 
the operationalizations yield continuous indicators and therefore correspond to the theoretical 
view that risk varies by degree.  
The picture becomes more complex when we move to insider-outsider theory. 
Initially, insider-outsider operationalizations were based on labor-market status. Following 
Rueda (2007), outsiders often comprise the unemployed and non-standard workers (without 
full-time permanent contracts).2 Others have argued that this composite operationalization 
disguises important differences (Emmenegger 2009; Marx and Picot 2013). As a result, 
different labor market situations such as unemployment, part-time work, or temporary 
contracts are measured by separate dummy variables (e.g. Burgoon and Dekker 2010; 
Gelepithis and Jeannet 2017). Recently the approach has been extended to precarious self-
employment (Jansen 2017). Because several studies have indeed uncovered substantial 
differences between different ‘outsider’ situations, there are strong empirical reasons for the 
differentiated over the composite approach.  
 




Operationalizations based on labor-market status correspond directly to the theoretical 
substance of insider-outsider theory: risk is distributed discontinuously because legally 
defined labor market segments are divided by mobility barriers. Moreover, the differentiated 
operationalization is intuitive, transparent, and easy to implement (provided datasets include 
appropriate variables). Nevertheless, there are three caveats. First, labor-market status is an 
individual characteristic whereas workers in reality often share resources in households. 
Second, an individual’s current employment contract disregards the she may expect to 
proceed to a different, possibly better, labor market status in the near future. Third, labor-
market status might conceal heterogeneity in more important characteristics (such as age, 
gender, occupation, or education). 
Motivated by these limitations, Schwander and Häusermann (2013) have developed 
an alternative insider-outsider operationalization. They examine labor market situations in 
groups defined through the intersection of post-industrial social classes, gender, and 
(dichotomized) age. The difference between the group-specific and the total-workforce rate 
of non-standard employment and unemployment then yields a group-specific continuous 
measure of “outsiderness”, used as an individual-level variable. Because of the complexity of 
this operationalization and because it has been adopted by other researchers, it merits a closer 
look.  
If insider-outsider divides are seen as a new base for class politics (as some have 
suggested), rather than merely one type of labor market vulnerability, this approach brings 
theoretical advantages. It identifies demographically homogenous groups that are collectively 
disadvantaged. However, in our view, these advantages come at considerable costs. To begin 
with, this operationalization implicitly draws on at least three theoretical frameworks: post-
industrial class, insider-outsider divides, and individual risk. This theoretical ambiguity 
creates three problems. First, the basic indicators the operationalization is based on (post-
industrial class, gender, and age) have all been used as independent explanations of political 
preferences. Hence, the composite indicator is likely to pick up other influences than labor 
market vulnerability. Second, insider-outsider divides can run through occupational groups. 
Rising occupational unemployment might increase the vulnerability of all members of an 
occupation as general demand for an occupation declines. Yet, in case of strict dismissal 
protection, the risk of temporary workers in that occupation is much higher than the risk of 
those on permanent contracts. Indeed, a high share of temporary workers reduces the risk of 
the others. This is because employers achieve employment flexibility through hiring non-
standard workers, which (at least in the short term) reduces flexibility pressure on standard 
workers. Hence, the outsiderness indicator risks categorizing workers who may well be 
highly protected insiders as outsiders if they work in an occupation with many non-standard 
workers. Third, by adopting a continuous measure that varies across a wide span of 
differently composed groups the indicator assimilates the individual-risk approach in spite of 
being originally motivated by insider-outsider theory. It uses group-specific unemployment 
and non-standard employment rates similarly to Rehm’s (2009) occupational unemployment 
rate. For this reason, Vlandas (this issue) subsumes Schwander and Häusermann (2013) under 
the occupational unemployment approach in spite of their reference to insider-outsider 
theory. This raises two questions: does the operationalization still speak to insider-outsider 
theory with its emphasis on institutionally defined labor market segments? And does it 
produce an empirical value-added compared to simpler individual-risk measures such as 
occupational unemployment rates? In any case, ‘Schwander-Häusermann outsiders’ are 
different people than ‘Rueda outsiders’ and they do have different political preferences 
(Rovny and Rovny 2017).  
By contrast, labor-market status is close to the original notion of insider-outsider 




acknowledge its limitations. Households do matter, but can be accounted for with appropriate 
data (e.g. Marx and Picot 2013). Demographic heterogeneity within a certain labour-market 
status can be controlled for statistically. That said, we fully share the agnosticism whether 
labor-market status alone serves as a new class base. The most important shortcoming, in our 
view, is that it cannot account for heterogeneity in employment prospects. This can be 
remedied by using additional variables - either based on individuals’ subjective mobility 
prospects (Marx 2015) or occupational information (Vlandas this issue). Another aspect to 
keep in mind is that implications of labor-market status vary by institutional context. For 
example, what it means to be unemployed depends critically on passive and active labor 
market policy; and how well protected open-ended contracts really are depends on the 
regulation of dismissals. Analyses of labor-market status should therefore remain context-
sensitive, whether this is done more coarsely through multi-level analysis or through 
embedding micro-analysis in (comparative) case studies (e.g. Lindvall and Rueda 2014; Marx 
and Picot 2014). More generally, institutional context should influence decisions on which 
vulnerability measure is relevant. Temporary employment, for instance, matters less in the 
United States (Gelepithis and Jeannet 2017), but cannot be neglected in Continental and 
Southern Europe (Marx 2015). 
The third approach uses survey respondents’ self-placement on subjective-insecurity 
scales. Typically, this means (dis)agreement with statements such as “My job is secure” 
(cognitive [in-]security) or answers to questions such as “Do you worry about the possibility 
of losing your job?” (affective insecurity). As mentioned, the major advantage of subjective 
measures is that they reflect all relevant sources of job insecurity. Even if risk perceptions are 
inaccurate they should matter for political preferences. Hence, compared to socio-structural 
measures, they are closer to political preferences in the causal chain. Considering these clear 
advantages and the fact that subjective insecurity is widely studied in sociology and 
psychology, it is surprising that it is not more commonly considered in political-preference 
research. Also in this symposium it is conspicuously absent. An important and well-justified 
criticism when political views are regressed on subjective economic perceptions is the 
possible endogeneity of both variables to an overall set of political commitments. It is, for 
instance, plausible that insecurity stems from perceptions of the macro-economy that are 
biased through party identification, which, in turn, correlates with political preferences. As a 
result, insecurity-preference correlations  could be artificially inflated. Similar concerns have 
led to intense debates in economic-voting research (see Marx 2014 for a discussion). 
Promising ways to tackle this problem are the use of panel data and experimental studies. In 
addition, it can be a good starting point to assess empirically the extent of the problem. In one 
study (Marx 2014), the insecurity-preference correlation did not change substantively when 





Researchers who want to include labor-market vulnerability in their analysis of political 
preferences can draw on three different approaches. With due attention to theoretically 
consistent and transparent operationalization, the three approaches can complement each 
other. We regard the following three indicators (one from each approach) as most useful: 
occupational unemployment rates, labor market status, and subjective job insecurity.  
Occupational unemployment is a theoretically convincing measure as it captures the 
balance of supply and demand for a certain skill set. It addresses not only the risk of losing a 
job but also difficulties in finding one. What it does not capture is insider-outsider divides 




distinctions in the labor market: having employment or not as well as different types of 
employment contract. Together, the two measures, occupational unemployment rate and 
labor market status, go a long way in capturing the objective labor market situation of an 
individual: the general market forces for her skill set and her starting point in facing those 
market forces. It is reasonable to expect that both factors will influence political preferences 
by themselves. In addition, it is likely that occupational unemployment will affect individuals 
differently depending on their labor-market status, which suggests studying interaction 
effects of the two (Vlandas this issue). When selecting measures and when interpreting 
results, it is important to account for the institutional context. This applies especially to labor-
market status.  
We recommend subjective job insecurity for studying the psychological mechanisms 
that translate ‘objective’ vulnerability into political preferences. Although subjective 
insecurity can be theorized as an independent variable on political preferences, the problem 
of endogeneity is not easily resolved in observational research. Therefore, we suggest three 
ways to use subjective indicators: first, as a direct explanatory variable if the reasons for 
insecurity are secondary and if suitable methods are available to reduce unobserved 
heterogeneity. This could be reached through relying on intra-personal variation over time 
(Margalit 2013) or through priming insecurity experimentally (Levine 2015). Second, 
subjective insecurity can be studied as an intermediate outcome. If the effect of objective 
measures on preferences is mediated by subjective risk perception, this makes the underlying 
theory more plausible (Walter 2010). Conversely, including the link between objective and 
subjective insecurity would be a good starting point to explore in which contexts labor-
market status produces only weak effects on preferences (e.g. because insiders become 
insecure). Third, subjective measures, such as self-assessment of employment prospects, can 
be used as a moderator of labor market status. This takes into account that outsiders (by labor 
market status) can have contrasting career expectations (Marx 2015). Subjective measures 
hence can help distinguish de jure and de facto outsiders in a parsimonious way. Of course, 
this approach is vulnerable to the same endogeneity concerns discussed above. It therefore is 
helpful to complement it with longitudinal data on observed employment trajectories 
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